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The Air Force currently suffers from excessively high attrition rates in the 
cyberspace career. The field is currently aiming to develop an entrance examination for 
the career, striving to improve personnel selection and decrease these high attrition rates. 
The attribute of suspicion is a key focus of the preliminary examination development, 
theorizing that it is a potential indicator present among competent cyber operators. This 
research makes use of the Suspicion Propensity Index (SPI), a reliable measure of one’s 
tendency to be suspicious, along with the highly cited Mayer’s trust questionnaire in 
order to compare the attributes that appear in successful cyberspace individuals compared 
to those with no cyber experience. These measures are analyzed in comparison to a cyber 
mission performance questionnaire, adapted to assess each participant’s cyberspace 
capabilities. The three aforementioned questionnaires were distributed to two distinct 
populations: a group of experienced cyber operators averaging 22.8 years in the career 
field and a group of Airmen from various career fields with no prior cyber experience.  
The research yields evidence that suspicion levels are significantly correlated to 
cyber mission performance scores among both the cyber and non-cyber populations, with 
cyber operators demonstrating higher overall levels of suspicion than those of non-cyber 
operators. Years of experience displays a more prominent effect on the suspicion levels 
of cyber personnel, with the non-cyber sample population displaying more constant levels 
of suspicion despite time in the Air Force. This evidence suggests that cyber operators 
gain suspicion over time in comparison to their non-cyber counterparts. The trust 
questionnaire scores were significantly correlated to SPI scores. However, results of the 
trust questionnaire do not appear to provide a prediction of cyber mission performance.  
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RECOGNIZING POTENTIAL CYBERSPACE WARRIORS THROUGH THE USE 
OF SUSPICION PROPENSITY INDEX  
I.  Introduction  
1.1 General Issue 
As war fighting in the cyber domain rapidly evolves, the Air Force must be equipped 
with the finest airmen capable of innovating technology, techniques, tactics, and procedures to 
continually improve the United States’ offensive and defensive capabilities on a global level. 
Innovation in the cyber domain is critical to fulfill the Air Force’s mission and to pursue 
excellence in the air, space, and cyberspace domains. Despite the Air Force mission’s emphasis 
placed in the cyberspace domain, this area lacks the same personnel selection, training, and 
structural foundation as the companion domains of air and space.  
To maintain dominance in the air, the Air Force carefully selects well-equipped pilot 
candidates from Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachments, Officer Training School, 
and the country’s service academies. Candidate Pilots are held to strict standards and must meet 
multiple qualifications before being considered eligible for the career field. For example, they 
must have a minimum education of a bachelor’s degree with a grade point average greater than 
2.5 and obtain certain scores on the pilot portion and pilot-navigator portion of the Air Force 
Officer Qualifying Test (U.S. Air Force).  Pilot training is rigorous, multiple years long, and 
therefore expensive to conduct for each pilot trainee. Yet this in-depth training is necessary to 
ensure that the United States is equipped with the finest airmen to conduct specific operations. 
Select individuals within this career field are engaged to refine future techniques, tactics and 




Airmen selected for careers in the space field are also carefully selected, as the field 
requires a basic background knowledge of space warning and control systems. Space Operations 
Officers are required to have the minimum education of a bachelor’s degree in a science, 
technology, engineering, or math (STEM) discipline, while enlisted Space Operators are required 
to have at least 15 college credits in a STEM field along with meeting certain scores on the 
electrical component of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test (U.S. 
Air Force). In addition to the background requirements for knowledge in the field, 
Undergraduate Space Training is a rigorous six-month program and is only the foundation for 
additional system-specific training that must be completed.   
While the Air Force strives to dominate in air, space, and cyberspace, there is a clear 
dissonance between the qualifications for the cyber field in comparison to the other two domains. 
Dissimilar to the air and space components, the cyber component lacks the strenuous prerequisite 
demands and does not necessitate any rigid credentials before entering the field.  The cyber 
career field also suffers from extremely high attrition rates during training activities, highlighting 
it as one of the Air Force’s top manning priorities in 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Losey, 2018).  These 
attrition rates have brought attention to the field in hopes of meeting the increasing quotas for 
cyber airmen and their likelihood to remain in the field.  
One potential option for the Air Force is to enhance the selection criteria for cyberspace 
airmen, consequently boosting the knowledge that individuals must obtain prior to entering the 
field. However, individuals with prerequisite computer science skills are in high demand within 
both the civilian and government realms. Computer engineering holds one of the highest paying 
starting salaries for students graduating with a college degree (Somers & Moody, 2019). The 
financial incentives associated with careers in this field may be one of the reasons that the 
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number of computer science bachelor’s degrees has risen by 74% since 2009 (Hambrusch, 
2017). While the number of graduates who are competent in the realm of computer science and 
computer engineering is growing, so is the industry’s need for individuals with this skillset. This 
demand makes it critical for the Air Force to carefully balance the Human Systems Integration 
domains of personnel, manpower, and training when considering which airmen are best fit for 
the cyber career field.  
As cyber selection currently operates, a large number of commissioned and enlisted 
Airmen are assigned to the field to cushion the high attrition rate. This reduces the average 
workforce cost as it relieves the Air Force from paying above market salaries to entice a smaller 
number of more experienced, highly educated, cyber personnel. However, by accepting Airmen 
who require greater amounts of training to prepare them to be successful operators in the cyber 
field and make them mission-ready, training costs are increased. If selection criteria was more 
stringent for the field as a whole, fewer individuals should wash out of training, it may be 
possible to enhance the quality of the training, and it is possible that a lesser number of highly 
capable individuals, as opposed to larger groups of less capable individuals, would be needed to 
execute the Air Force’s cyber needs.  Figure 1 is a causal loop diagram displaying the balance 
between the different considerations in respect to the cyber field. To choose the optimal quantity 
and quality of individuals in the career field, many interconnected factors must be taken into 
consideration. Manpower is made possible by material support and the cost of retaining the 
number of individuals in the field. It in turn affects the cost of personnel, which forms a cyclical 
pattern by affecting retention costs. Experience in the cyber field is another consideration that 
plays a role in the cost of personnel, along with selection criteria which also affects the cost and 




Figure 1. Causal Loop Diagram for considerations for the selection process of individuals into the cyber career field. 
To properly select individuals with a predisposition for success as cyber operators, one option is 
the development of an entrance examination for the career field. This examination could be 
extremely beneficial to filter out individuals who lack the foundational attributes that are needed 
within the field, along with identifying those who are prone to success. 
The use of an entrance examination for specific career fields in the Air Force is a practice 
that has been successfully instilled throughout many career fields. The Air Force Officer 
Qualifying Test (AFOQT) is used in combination with the Pilot Candidate Selection Method 
(PCSM) to identify qualified candidates for flying career fields such as pilot, air battle 
management (ABM), and combat systems officer (CSO). The AFOQT is particularly beneficial 
for officers seeking to go into the rated career field with no prior flying experience. In a 2013 
study, of 139 Undergraduate Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Training students who took the 
PCSM and AFOQT prior to beginning training, the scores exemplified good predictive validity 
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(AFOQT r = 0.378, PCSM r = 0.48) for determining completion of the undergraduate training 
(Carretta, 2013).  Thus, individuals who were successful on this initial examination were 
significantly more likely to successfully complete training than individuals who were not 
successful on this examination. This study portrays the importance of selecting individuals with 
little to no experience based on their propensity for success in the career field. To implement a 
similar examination for the cyber career field, testing categories should aim to screen for cyber-
propensity as opposed to exclusively testing for current cyber knowledge.  
In addition to rated career fields, certain jobs requiring fluency in foreign language use 
quantitative measures to gauge an individual’s fitness for these career fields. The Defense 
Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) is used for individuals who are already fluent in a foreign 
language which is needed for current military operations. As the test is currently scored, a 
person’s language proficiency is measured on a scale of zero to three with three being the 
highest. However, a newer version of the DLPT is being developed that will include a scale from 
zero to five. Another proficiency exam includes the Defense Language Aptitude Battery 
(DLAB), which measures one’s aptitude for learning a specific language. This is more 
commonly used for individuals who are not currently fluent in a language that is needed by the 
Department of Defense (DOD), but who are seeking a job that requires this skill.  To develop a 
DLAB similar entrance exam for the cyber career field, the Air Force must first understand 
exactly what traits and characteristics make an individual more adept for cyber operations.  
This requirement has been recognized by the Air Force and has resulted in the generation 
of a need for additional exploration. This research is being conducted in response to the topic 
“Recognizing Potential Cyberspace Warriors” within the Air University Prioritized Research 
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Topics within the Cyber category. The research discussed in this thesis attempts to help foster an 
entrance examination, which is claimed to be under preliminary development through the 
addition of a questionnaire focused on understanding the propensity of a person to be suspicious. 
Cyber operators are required to install and support cyber systems, along with ensuring their 
proper operation and protection from outside intrusion. The preliminary belief that suspicion is a 
helpful attribute within the cyber career field stems from the tendencies of suspicious personnel. 
Suspicion allows individuals to recognize unusual items or actions in specific situations, while a 
natural tendency towards curiosity allows suspicious individuals to elicit information and surveil 
for potentially threatening actions. If an individual is naturally inclined to be suspicious and 
prone to act upon these tendencies, they may be able to bolster cyber capabilities by maintaining 
safe and secure operations. The overall objective of this research is to assist in the Air Force’s 
development of the entrance examination. This research aims to reveal insightful information 
regarding how suspicion correlates with successful operators in the cyber field. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
The Air Force cyber career field lacks a field-specific entrance examination for its officer and 
enlisted airmen. This lack of a screening process is partially responsible for the field’s suffering 
from high attrition rates and low retention among its personnel. If the career field could determine 
specific attributes that are correlated with success as a cyberspace warrior, it may help reduce 
washout rates and develop a more effective cyberspace domain in the Air Force as a whole. The 
long-term objective of the current work is to create a screening tool, aiming to reduce washout 
rates and increase retention in the cyberspace domain, thus saving manpower and training dollars 
for the United States Air Force.  
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1.3 Research Objectives  
In consideration of the cyber environment and the actions which take place within the cyber 
domain, both human performance and hardware/software performance compromise the overall 
system performance. While a vast amount of research is constantly being conducted to improve 
technological capabilities, research is sparse regarding which attributes affect the human operator 
while conducting cyber operations. This research will investigate suspicion, aiming to identify its 
contribution to operator performance in the cyber field. It will also investigate trust as a potential 
inverse characteristic of suspicion.  
As it is currently accepted, suspicion is a state attribute that is affected by individual differences 
of the perceiver. Recent studies have revealed that for a person to enter a state of suspicion, the 
individual is first aroused by a specific trigger within her or his environment. This cue is then 
interpreted by the individual in regard to their specific personality traits and propensity to be 
suspicious. If the individual is sufficiently aroused, he or she will enter a suspicious state (Bobko 
et al., 2014). It has been recently concluded that at different situational levels, individual 
personality differences are responsible for either inhibiting or catalyzing this state of suspicion 
(Khazon, 2016).  
A suspicious state is one that produces uncertain feelings in regard to the individual’s 
environment, a feeling of malicious intent towards the trigger that is responsible for the suspicious 
state, along with cognitive activity such as indications of stress, perceived increase of cognitive 
load, and heightened emotional arousal (Khazon, 2016). For example, a cynical individual will 




Another potential individual trait that may affect suspicion is the predisposition for trust and/or 
distrust. As suspicion relies partially on one’s uncertainty in a situation, a predisposition for trust 
has the potential to increase levels of certainty within a specific context. Contrarily, distrust may 
act as a catalyzing factor for an increase in suspicion (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011).   
This research posits that one’s propensity for the attribute of suspicion will yield a relevant 
correlation with mission performance in the cyber career field. State suspicion propensity is 
defined as “a person’s simultaneous state of cognitive activity, uncertainty, and perceived 
malintent about underlying information that is being electronically generated, collated, sent, 
analyzed, or implemented by an external agent” (Bobko, Barelka, Hershfield, 2014). This research 
will aim to measure the attributes of an individual’s propensity for suspicion, perception of 
malintent, uncertainty of information, and the engagement in cognitive activity associated with 
generating meanings for possible information in relation to his or her experience and expertise in 
the cyber career field. This research will also aim to determine whether individuals who have been 
successful in the cyber career field will exhibit a greater propensity for the attribute of suspicion 
than members of other career fields in the Department of Defense.  
As the characteristic of suspicion is proving to be a prevalent area of focus in the field of 
cyberspace operations, an objective of this study is to investigate the means in which an enhanced 
understanding of how suspicion’s role amongst cyber operators could assist in the development of 
an effective screening tool for entrance to the career field. Through a number of surveys and 
questionnaires, this research aims to explore how the information collected on current members of 
the cyber career compares to the same information gathered from their non-cyber counterparts 
with the aim of providing insight into whether the Air Force and military at large should explore 
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measures of the characteristic of suspicion and trust to assist in their selection process for future 
cyber warriors.  
1.4 Research Questions  
The following research questions (RQ) will be investigated throughout this study:  
• 1.4.1 (RQ-1): Is an individual’s level of suspicion correlated to her or his success within 
the cyberspace career field?  
• 1.4.2 (RQ-2): Do current Air Force cyber operators differ in their levels of suspicion when 
compared to members of other career fields? 
• 1.4.3 (RQ-3): Does an Airman’s years of experience in their field correlate to significant 
differences in levels of suspicion? 
• 1.4.4 (RQ-4): Does an Airman’s propensity to trust correlate with both her or his levels of 
suspicion and success within the cyberspace career field? 
1.5 Research Hypotheses  
The following research hypotheses (RH) were developed in relation to the research questions:  
• 1.5.1 (RH-1): An individual’s scores on the SPI and the Mission Scenario questionnaire 
will yield a positively correlated relationship. Those who score high on the SPI will also 
do well on the Mission Scenario Questionnaire, and vice versa.  
• 1.5.2 (RH-2): Suspicion levels and career field are not independent, thus cyber operators 
will yield higher SPI scores in comparison to members of other career fields.  
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• 1.5.3 (RH-3): Years of experience will have a positive correlation to an individual’s SPI 
score.  This correlation will be stronger within the cyber career field than that of other 
career fields.  
• 1.5.4 (RH-4): Trust questionnaire scores will yield a negative correlation with both an 
individual’s SPI score and her or his Mission Scenario questionnaire score.  
1.6 Research Focus/Scope  
 Within the realm of this study, cyber operators were expected to exhibit higher levels of 
suspicion than airmen of other career fields, as well as exhibit increased levels of suspicion with 
increased experience. Trust was also expected to display a negative relationship with both 
suspicion and cyber performance. These hypotheses have the potential to significantly impact the 
selection process for operators entering the cyber career field. The identification of suspicion and 
trust as traits potentially correlated to the predisposition for success in cyber operations has the 
capacity to assist the Air Force in screening individuals entering the field. This study also 
expected a general increase in suspicion levels as individuals gain more experience, with the rate 
of increase being higher in cyber operators. This may indicate that suspicion is a trainable 
attribute and that it can be developed in individuals over time. These increases would yield 
useful results for the Air Force throughout their cyber personnel selection process, as they would 
allow the measurement of suspicion to be adjusted regarding a person’s age and background.  
1.7 Methodology Overview  
Multiple measurement methods provided a basis for data collection within this thesis to 
include a demographics questionnaire, a Suspicion Propensity Index, trust assessment, and mission 
scenario questionnaire. The demographics questionnaire was administered to gather pre-survey 
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information about the participants. Next, an eleven-item Suspicion Propensity Index (Bobko et al., 
n.d.)  was given to measure the components of each individual’s level of suspicion, including that 
of cyber operators and non-cyber operators. Trust was assessed through an eight-item survey 
designed to measure both trust and distrust (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). Perfomance at 
various cyber operations was measured through a six-item survey, referred to as the Mission 
Performance Questionnaire, in which different scenarios were presented to the participants and 
they were instructed to choose the best response to each case. A total of 122 individuals 
participated in this research, including 57 from the cyber career field and 65 from career fields 
other than cyber. Data was analyzed using multiple techniques to include simple linear regression, 
T-tests, correlation tables, and multiple linear regression.  
1.8 Assumptions/Limitations  
The current research is not intended to develop an all-encompassing personnel selection 
tool, but rather to consider whether suspicion as a trait attribute may be one of multiple useful 
criteria useful in the development of such a tool. It is recognized that other influences, such as an 
individual’s preemptive interest in cyberspace operations, aptitude in the computer science realm, 
greater interest in other career fields, etc. may be more important than suspicion when selecting 
individuals for participation in the cyberspace career field.    
A potential limitation of this study is not having access to the individuals who are currently 
undergoing cyber training, as a way to measure preliminary suspicion and success throughout the 
preliminary training courses for the career field. Additional information that would be helpful but 
was not available is access to the individuals who did not successfully complete cyber training, 
including students who have failed the preliminary courses or withdrew from the career field for 
lack of the necessary skills to perform the necessary operations within the field. These individuals 
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could provide insight into personality types and suspicion propensity for unsuccessful career field 
candidates. However, due to the Privacy Act of 1974, the personal information for these individuals 
is protected which currently limits our ability to track individuals through the training process.  
An additional limitation of this study arises from the sample of individuals participating in 
the Continuing Education Cyber courses at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. It is a possibility that 
these individuals are not representative of the career field at large, resulting in a sampling bias. 
Due to the voluntary nature of the survey, it is also possible that only certain types of individuals 
participated in the study. This possibility also holds true for the non-cyber participants, as the 
surveys were also administered on a voluntary basis. 
1.9 Implications 
If this research helps in the assessment of attributions correlated with successful airmen as 
cyberspace operators, it has the potential to reduce the cost and effort spent to train ill-equipped 
airmen who wish to enter the career field. With the current lack of a screening examination for the 
career field, many airmen are being assigned to cyber even though they may not have the 
knowledge or propensity for success in the current training program or the field. With the help of 
the SPI and other research on what makes a cyberspace airman effective, the Air Force should be 
able to select men and women who are more predisposed to success. This will decrease the chance 
that these men and women will wash-out of the training program, allowing these individuals to 
flourish in other fields. It will also allow for more focus and higher quality training for the 
individuals who do participate in the field’s training program, leading to more knowledgeable and 
informed cyberspace airmen. This has great potential to eventually enhance the innovative 
techniques and improve our success against the nation’s enemies. Lower washout rates amongst 
cyber training will also yield great savings in both time and money for the DoD as a whole.  
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In the human factors and psychology academic fields of study, this research could provide 
extremely insightful information on an important topic that currently has received limited research. 
The element of suspicion is an important topic as it plays a role in everyday life at both the 
individual and organizational level. By further exploring this topic, many opportunities could be 
created to provide insight into how humans interact with one another and with machines. Insight 
on suspicion has the potential to both explain and expand upon already existing theories in 
psychology, sociology, and other social sciences. Having such insights can improve organizational 
behavior through an understanding of suspicion, along with how these suspicion levels may be 




II. Literature Review 
2.1 Literature-Based Construct of Suspicion  
 The topic of suspicion is one that is relevant in many fields and its use in systems 
involving human-automation teams is likely to increase with growing dependence on automated 
systems in today’s society. Although little investigation has been conducted in the past regarding 
the causes of suspicion and its effects on human interactions, scientists have recently attempted 
to uncover what suspicion really means and how it develops as a trait. 
 In the existing literature, suspicion has been studied as a relevant domain in social 
psychology, management and communication, marketing, and human factors psychology 
(Khazon, 2016). In social psychology, suspicion is defined as “a dynamic state in which the 
individual actively entertains multiple, plausibly rival hypotheses about the motive or 
genuineness of a person’s behavior” (Fein, 1996). In communications and management 
literature, it is defined as “the degree to which a person is uncertain about the honesty of some 
specific communication content thereby stimulating a construal of motives in an effort to assess 
potential deceptive intent” (Kim & Levine, 2011). While different fields view suspicion through 
vastly different lenses, the literature has many common themes while describing the attribute that 
must be discussed.   
 2.1.1 Uncertainty. First, suspicion stems from a sense of uncertainty. Uncertainty occurs 
when an operator does not have enough information regarding a target to foresee a future action.  
The presence of uncertainty has been commonly studied in negotiation strategies, persuasive 
tactics, and in managerial positions. A common theme of these studies involves suspension of 
judgement and delayed decisions due to doubt one has when interacting with another entity 
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(Hilton, Fein, & Miller, 1993). Uncertainty alone is only one important facet of suspicion and 
does not act independently in the characteristic. For example, a person can be uncertain about a 
technology or software due to lack of training, but this does not mean that they are necessarily 
suspicious of its functionality (Bobko et al., 2014).   
 2.1.2 Malicious Intent. Malicious intent, often abbreviated to “malintent,” implies some 
form of dishonesty or attempt at manipulation by an outside source to harm or degrade the 
performance of the operator. An operator experiences malicious intent when they question one’s 
motives and perception of interference with their own goals, or cause harm in some other way 
(Khazon, 2016). The literature indicates that malicious intent acts in conjunction with uncertainty 
when an operator perceives the potential outcome of the uncertain action to have negative 
consequences. While it is possible for intent to be cast in a positive light, such as entrepreneurs 
taking risks in business ventures, the context of this study focuses on the negative instances that 
are associated with suspicion (Bobko et al., 2014).  
 2.1.3 Cognitive Activity. The final element of the accepted suspicion definition is 
cognitive activity. Cognitive activity refers to the mental processing that is required to predict 
incentives and future outcomes when dealing with the target. Several literatures have shown that 
a state of suspicion is correlated with higher activation levels when processing information, 
along with higher levels of engagement and thought processes (Kim & Levine, 2011).  
 In an attempt to synthesize these commonalities into one generally accepted definition, 
Bobko et al. (2014) conducted a study on suspicion in the Information Technology field and 
defined state suspicion as “a person’s simultaneous state of cognitive activity, uncertainty, and 
perceived malintent about underlying information that is being electronically generated, collated, 
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sent, or implemented by an external agent.” Using the vast amount of research available 
regarding trust and distrust through several domains, Bobko et al. (2014) attempted to relate 
suspicion to these characteristics and incorporated them into the introduction of a three-stage 
model, describing suspicion as a dynamic process. The model attempts to discuss how a person 
enters a suspicious state and then predict the immediate outcomes of this suspicion. A graphical 
depiction of the model is shown in Figure 2, followed by an in-depth description of each stage.  
 
Figure 2. The 3 stages that encompass a suspicious state, adapted from Bobko et al., (2014).  
 Stage I. Stage I of Bobko’s three-stage model involves the perception and interpretation 
of environmental cues. Cues result in increased levels for uncertainty and malintent through a 
violation of the actor’s expectation from a target. The exposure to this violation results in a 
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trigger of state suspicion (Bobko et al., 2014). Environmental cues can have many patterns.  
These include the following: 
Missing information. It has been shown that humans are wired to trust others in a 
community after they have opened up about personal life and revealed private information 
(Ridings, Gefen, & Arinze, 2000). Past research has also shown that when subjects perceive that 
policies are missing information, they are more likely to suspect that hidden motives are 
involved in the policy (Ebenbach & Moore, 2000). When information is absent as opposed to 
present, people are more likely to perceive the situation as suspicious.  
Patterns of negative discrepancy. When users experience a dissonance between their 
expectations of system behavior and the behavior that is actually witnessed, state level suspicion 
is more likely to be cued (Bobko et al., 2014). Additionally, as subjects observe failures across a 
system, they are less likely to perceive the software as reliable. In the event that the operator 
views the system as undependable, they will be less likely to trust the system.  
System interface characteristics. Usability characteristics such as video quality and 
response time have been found to correlate with increased levels of user trust (Lee & See, 2004). 
Situational trust, one of the three layers that compromise an individual’s trust in automated 
systems, is described as being dependent upon specific content of an interaction between a user 
and a specific system (Hoff & Bashir, 2015). The factors depicted in Figure 3 are those that 





Figure 3. Influencing factors on situational trust, adapted from Hoff and Bashir (2015).  
These factors directly influence one’s interaction with a system and trust levels. When an 
individual is uncertain about these factors, suspicion is likely to be impacted.  
Stage II. Stage II of the suspicion process model is the filtering stage. During this stage, 
the interpretation of environmental cues is influenced by an individual’s characteristics. This 
includes one’s prior life experiences, willingness to rely upon automated systems, and cognitive 
resources (Bobko et al., 2014). One’s interpretation of environmental cues is also dependent 
upon trust propensity, also described as dispositional trust. Dispositional trust is trust that is 
independent of the context of a situation or the environment in which an interaction occurs. 
Instead, it is built upon individual characteristics that have been formed over a person’s life 
through experience and biological influences. The factors that impact dispositional trust are 




Figure 4. Influencing factors on dispositional trust, adapted from Hoff and Bashir (2015). 
Stage III. The final stage of the suspicion process model is the formation and application 
of immediate outcomes. Based on the environmental cues and the different ways that individuals 
filter these cues in steps I and II, an immediate response is formed. If suspicious, a person will 
analyze the information collected and attempt to predict the next likely event that will occur 
given their response. This attempt to reduce uncertainty in the situation is thought to be both 
arousing and cognitively demanding (Khazon, 2016).  
 Bobko’s et al. (2014) development of the process of suspicion is an initial leap in the 
direction of describing the process humans undergo during the arousal of suspicion. However, it 
only addresses state-suspicion and does not reveal the causes and consequences of an individual 
becoming suspicious over sustained periods of time. Several studies have shown that humans 
have limited mental resources and when participating in mentally stimulating activity, the 
activities associated with suspicion pull from the same group of resources. Execution of this 
process results in the depletion of mental resources and an overall decrease in performance for 
effortful cognitive activities. This includes a decrease in levels of vigilance (Smit, Eling, & 
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Coenen, 2004). As described by Bobko et al. (2014), state-suspicion is both mentally stimulating 
and demanding. These findings would suggest that a prolonged suspicious state would further 
diminish cognitive resources and cause fatigue that prevents the process from being sustained 
over time.  
2.2 Trust and its Role in Suspicion  
Dictionary definitions of trust often include the description of “reliability,” “honesty,” 
and “assured anticipation.” In academia, one of the most commonly accepted definitions of trust 
is the “willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective 
of the ability to monitor or control that other party”, (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Other 
definitions in research add to this definition, including a willingness to depend on others and the 
expectation of certain outcomes (Khazon, 2016). The notions of anticipation, expectation, and 
predictability are what link trust to suspicion in its definition. As described by Bobko et al. 
(2014), when an individual recognizes negative discrepancies and missing information from a 
situation, the result will be characterized by an increased rate of information searching, greater 
processing of available information, and the formation of plausible hypotheses for the observed 
behavior. The process includes actions designed to assist the formation of an expected outcome, 
thus increasing the state-like presence of trust and decreasing the suspicion in a situation.  
It must be considered that when an individual has had no prior experience with an 
individual or cyber environment, he or she does not yet have any credible or meaningful 
information regarding that actor (Bigley and Pearce, 1998). As with most decision-making 
processes, one forms ideas based upon mental models and a set of rules that assist in the 
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development of opinions and beliefs (Falcone, Rino, et al., 2001). Interpretation rules allow 
individuals to categorize trust dilemmas and decide which evidence to search for in the 
assessment of another actor’s trustworthiness. Action-based rules assist in deciding how to 
engage in response to certain interpretations. Initial trust is also believed to be based upon two 
interconnected components including one’s willingness to depend and make themselves 
vulnerable, referred to as trusting intentions, and one’s perceptions of the other actor’s 
competence and integrity, referred to as trusting beliefs (McKnight, Choudhury, Kacmar, 2002).  
Each of the aforementioned processes and rules are applied to seek the common goal of gaining 
information which is useful in increasing the certainty in a situation, thus impacting suspicion.  
While prevalent theories posit that trust and suspicion have an interdependent 
relationship, some theories hold that trust, distrust, and suspicion are separate entities (Lyons, 
2011). These discrepant explanations of trust are distinguished from suspicion in their lack of 
presence of uncertainty. They claim that suspicion involves some ambiguity regarding a target’s 
motives or intentions, while trust and distrust are characterized by confident feelings that a target 
will behave in a certain manner. A state of suspicion has also been described as “the occurrence 
of an event if the disconfirmation of the expectation of the event’s occurrence is preferred to its 
conformation and if the expectation of its occurrence leads to behavior which is intended to 
reduce its negative motivational consequences” (Deutsch, 1958). In this viewpoint, trust is also 
described as the expectation of an occurring event which is perceived to have negative 
consequences if the expectation is not confirmed. These definitions separate trust and suspicion 
through the knowledge of a particular event, with suspicion being characterized by a lack of 




2.3 Cyber Warrior Development and Research 
 It is no secret that the scope of the cyber career field and its capabilities are expanding 
within the United States Air Force and the military at large, as well as practically within all other 
government and many commercial enterprises. As the need for cyber defense and the capabilities 
of cyber increases, the need for capable personnel continues to expand. This growth includes 
large numbers of individuals with education in computer science and computer engineering, 
further depleting the available pool of individuals with this educational background.  As such 
individuals within these disciplines are among the most sought after, resulting in more than one 
million unfilled computer science jobs in the United States in 2019 (Full Scale, 2019).  
To compensate for the lack of academically trained individuals across the Air Force and 
other branches, the DoD has instituted a four-phase model in an attempt to rapidly train and 
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maintain a mission capable cyber mission force (CMF). The model is shown in Figure 5 (GAO, 
2019). 
 
Figure 5. Cyber Mission Force Training Phase Model 
 To support robust personnel selection, there is a lack of knowledge regarding which 
characteristics are held by successful and competent cyber warriors. The following portion of 
this literature review will analyze the purpose of the cyber career field as it currently operates, 
along with exploring any underlying characteristics that cyber personnel develop and 
demonstrate. 
The DoD defines cyberspace as “the domain within the information environment that 
consists of the interdependent network of information technology (IT) infrastructures and 
resident data. It includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace operations (CO) is the employment of 
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cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through 
cyberspace”, (DoD Join publication 3-12 cyberspace operations, 2018). The proliferation of 
cyber attacks has posed a growing threat to government entities, business organizations, and 
individuals on a national and global level.  
With such a broad risk posed from a lack of cyber security, there is a high need for 
educated professionals to mitigate these risks. This necessity is compounded by the demand for 
professionals capable of performing offensive operations, including techniques that are critical 
for modern warfare and superiority.  However, there is a major shortage in these professionals 
that has led to a “human capital crisis in cybersecurity” (Evans & Reeder, 2010). In 2010, the 
founding director the CIA’s Clandestine Information Technology Office, Jim Gosler stated that, 
“There are about 1,000 security people in the US who have the specialized security skills to 
operate at world-class levels in cyberspace – we need 10,000 to 30,000.” At the time Gosler 
made this claim, U.S. Cyber Command was a sub-unified command operating under U.S. 
Strategic Command.  In May of 2018, Cyber Command was established as a unified combatant 
command, CYBERCOM, which was aimed at allowing the department to grow and streamline 
operations under a single commander (Lange, 2018). However, the Cyber Mission Force has 
only grown to 6,200 members, far below the projected requirement.  
With a low retention rate and a clear gap between the need for cyber workers and the 
quantity of those in the field, the cyber realm must make the most of the workforce that is 
available. While there has been little to no significant research regarding suspicion’s role in the 
capabilities of cyber personnel, there has been a growing amount of research in the past years 
aiming to uncover other common characteristics that are attributed to workers in numerous cyber 
fields. The findings include a mix of technical skills, those that are able to be taught and 
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reinforced through curriculum, along with soft skills that cannot be as easily learned such as 
communication, the ability to understand policy, and relationship building (Haney & Lutters, 
2017). 
Research was conducted to examine the personality traits of individuals who entered into 
a cybersecurity competition, comparing the competition’s participants to individuals not 
employed or involved in cyberspace security. The study found that on a Big Five personality 
scale, competitors scored significantly higher in Openness and Agreeableness and significantly 
lower in the dimension of Neuroticism (Wee, Bashir, Lambert, & Guo, 2016). High levels of 
openness were attributed to high levels of creativity, a drive to tackle unique challenges, and the 
ability to think about abstract concepts. High levels of agreeableness are attributed to taking an 
interest in other’s opinions of oneself, feeling empathy for others, and finding enjoyment in 
assisting others. Low levels of neuroticism are typically attributed to having emotional stability 
and the ability to handle stress (Pervin & John, 1999). It is possible that these cyber workers 
have a strong ability to think in an abstract manner along with a keen sense for the motives of 
others, two attributes that allow them to suspect when certain behavior is being construed. Their 
low levels of neuroticism could also allow them to respond to the uncertainty of these threats in a 
rapid manner.  
In an additional field of study, information technology (IT) professionals working in 
security management teams were interviewed to assess their skills, responsibilities, and 
characteristics (Botta et al., 2007). The study found that overwhelmingly, those in the workplace 
were strongly characterized by three driving characteristics, the first being a strong sense for 
inferential analysis. The workers described examples such as having a knack for finding what 
crashes a system, explaining why certain technology combinations are successful, resolving 
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Internet Protocol address issues, etc. The next characteristic involved pattern recognition. These 
descriptions included things such as recognizing anomalies, mentally separating relevant from 
irrelevant information, and correctly hypothesizing the presence of malicious intent. The final 
driving characteristic is bricolage, otherwise described as constructing infrastructure or ideas 
from a diverse range of information. The workers were noted as describing times when they 
would test technology and get machines working based on a trial and error method, without a 
reasonable explanation as to why certain events were successful. Interviewees repeatedly 
claimed that they would “play” with technology and appraise different outcomes to identify 
problems.  
While the study of suspicion as an attribute of cyber personnel is a topic that is only 
beginning to receive attention as an area of interest, the research conducted thus far 
overwhelmingly agrees that suspicion is comprised of a sense of uncertainty, the detection of 
malicious intent, and increased rates of cognitive activity. Aforementioned studies also conclude 
that cybersecurity competitors and IT professionals are often creative and abstract thinkers with 
the ability to face challenges as puzzles rather than as stressful hindrances to their performance. 
When considering the results of these studies in their entirety, perhaps the findings represent a 
cohesive conclusion that illustrates the thought processes of individuals who are highly 
competent in cyber operations. When individuals are faced with the presence of missing 
information and patterns of negative discrepancy, they must act in a creative manner to identify 
the malicious intent behind an action. This creative processing can be the result of enhanced 
levels of cognitive activity as the individual interprets cues and information from their 
environment. These individuals may act in a manner as not to alleviate stressors but to solve 
intriguing problems in hopes of reaping an immediate outcome. These attributes and processes 
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that are present in cyber operators closely align with the development of how an individual 
manages a suspicious situation in his or her environment.  
2.4 Summary 
In consideration of the research regarding human suspicion, this analysis served to review 
current knowledge on how suspicion arises and the effects of such suspicion. It first defined the 
different facets of suspicion and then the stages which a person goes through to act upon their 
suspicion. This paper then reviewed current literature regarding the cyber career field. It talked 
about the current state of the Cyber Force in the DoD, to include its major labor shortage. It then 
reviewed which attributes have been studied in cyber workers and how these attributes relate 





3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter introduces the methodology and design implemented to address the 
previously stated research questions stated in Section 1.4. It provides a description of the surveys 
and performance measures that were administered, the environment in which the research was 
conducted, and the individuals who participated in this study. This chapter also provides a brief 
overview of the Cyber 200 and 300 courses of which a portion of the study’s participants were 
students.    
3.2 Participants 
To gain a preliminary baseline measurement of suspicion levels amongst individuals who 
the Air Force categorizes as experts in the cyber career field, the surveys were first administered 
to 57 students upon the completion of Cyberspace Professional Continuing Education Courses, 
otherwise known as Cyber 200 and 300. The courses occurred in the Air Force Cyberspace 
Technical Center of Excellence within the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base. Participants consisted of officer and enlisted active duty personnel all within the 
Cyber Professional Workforce. The courses hold a prerequisite of eight career years in the field, 
with the students who completed the Suspicion Propensity Index having cyber experience 
ranging from 10 to 37 years (M = 22.8, SD = 7.25). Students enrolled in these courses are 
deemed highly competent by their career field and must be nominated to partake in this advanced 
training based on their abilities. The courses are far beyond introductory level and are held for 
top-performing cyber operators in an effort to maintain the expertise and competences necessary 
to triumph in future cyberspace conflicts.  
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In addition to the collection of baseline measurements from cyber personnel, data was 
collected from members of other career fields within the DoD having little to no cyber 
experience. These participants included officer and enlisted Air Force at the Air Force Institute 
of Technology (AFIT). These non-cyber participants were a mixture of students pursuing 
master’s degrees and other certificates offered at the university. The SPI, a trust measurement, 
and a Mission Scenario Questionnaire were administered to 65 participants ranging from 1 to 30 
years of government work experience (M = 8.93, SD = 8.06).  
Prior to beginning data collection, Cohen’s Power Primer (Cohen, 1992) was referenced 
to gain an estimate of recommended sample size for statistical relevance. Based on a power = 
0.80 and an alpha of 0.05, a necessary sample size of at least 64 was needed for a medium effect. 
With a total of 122 total participants (57 cyber and 65 non-cyber), this requirement was met.   
3.3 Measures 
As it has been proven by past studies, suspicion consists of three major components: 
cognitive activity, perception of malicious intent, and uncertainty (Bobko et al., 2014). All three 
must be present simultaneously for an individual to experience suspicion; therefore, the measure 
of suspicion must be derived through performance and outcome measures. Table 1 depicts the 
three measures that were used in this study, along with their number of data points (per 
participant), and the scale of each measure. In addition to these measurements, a demographics 
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questionnaire was administered to collect characteristics of the participants. The demographics 
questionnaire is shown in Appendix A.  
Table 1. Measurements Questionnaires 
Measurement Source Number of 
Items 
Scale 
Trust Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995 








Adapted with JSOC 
Cyber Special 
Missions Flt/CC  
6 0-6 
  
To conduct the measurement of suspicion levels amongst the subjects, the Suspicion 
Propensity Index was administered on a voluntary basis to the Cyber 200 and 300 students, along 
with non-cyber participants at the Air Force Institute of Technology. The SPI contained eleven 
situation-based items. Each scenario contained four responses with each response coded to 
represent one of the following indicators: trust, uncertainty and cognitive activity, paranoia, and 
uncertainty and perceived malintent. Each response was individually scored on a scale of one 
through five, with one being “not at all accurate” and five being “very accurate.” In total, the 
eleven scenarios and four responses per item provided 44 data points per participants. The 
Suspicion Propensity Index can be viewed in its entirety in Appendix B.  
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As Bobko et al. (2014) proposed that one’s propensity to trust is a factor of one’s 
capacity to become suspicious- and in consideration of the contested research regarding trust’s 
relationship to suspicion, trust was the next attribute to be measured amongst the AFIT student 
participants. As one of the most highly accepted and utilized questionnaires in academia, 
Mayer’s eight-item propensity to trust questionnaire was used for the trust measurement (Mayer, 
Davis, and Schoorman, 1995).  The eight items of the questionnaire were scored on a scale of 
one to seven, with one being “strongly disagree” and seven being “strongly agree.” The 
questionnaire can be viewed in its entirety in Appendix C.  
In order to measure performance in cyber operations, participants completed a six-
scenario questionnaire used to measure general inclinations regarding the recognition and 
response to potential cyber threats. The scenarios were adapted from an already-existing set of 
training scenarios that are utilized by cyber mission defense teams across Air Education and 
Training Command (AETC) bases. The scenarios were provided by the Cyber Special Missions 
Flight at Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). AETC uses these scenarios are 
representative of relevant and current cyber threats, and provide opportunity to assess and train 
cyber forces ensuring their continuation of knowledge and training.  The scenarios were 
contained in a questionnaire containing a description of the situation along with three potential 
responses to that situation. While the items were carefully constructed to trigger the participants’ 
use of judgement, each scenario ultimately had only one correct action response. The 






The primary focus of this research is to investigate how an individual’s capabilities in 
cyber operations are affected by her or his propensity for suspicion, along with how suspicion 
levels differ amongst individuals with different experience levels and varying career fields. To 
capture variety within a sample population of non-cyber individuals, the questionnaire measures 
were administered on a voluntary basis to students at the Air Force Institute of Technology, 
differing in age and coming from a wide assortment of career and educational fields other than 
the cyber career field. The participants first took the demographics questionnaire (Appendix A), 
followed by the SPI (Appendix B), trust measurement questionnaire (Appendix C), and mission 
scenario questionnaire (Appendix D). While the demographics questionnaire collects information 
regarding the background of the participants, their names were not recorded, and their responses 
were thus anonymous. The surveys were collected at large from the students to ensure their 
anonymity and were scored using a participant identification number.  
In order to capture variety within a sample of individuals within the cyber career field, 
the questionnaires were administered on an optional basis to students upon completion of the 
Cyber 200 and 300 courses, also taking place at the Air Force Institute of Technology. Each 
course has a three-week duration and occurs roughly every month. The data was collected from 
courses that were conducted between April and October of 2019, and the survey was offered on 
the last day of the course upon completion.  Overall, 122 individuals participated in the study 





3.5 Analysis Overview 
This experiment’s data was analyzed using multiple techniques. First, descriptive statistics 
were used to overview basic trends and relationships within the data. A basic Pearson Correlation 
table was used to investigate the statistical association between variables to include the perfomance 
meausre assessment, total SPI score, total Mayer’s trust quetionnaire score, career (cyber vs. non-
cyber), years in military service, and the individual entities of the SPI  to include trust, cognitive 
activitation, paranoia, and uncertainty and malintent. Next, linear regression was performed to 
determine the strength of a statistical relationship between SPI scores and mission performance 
questionnaire scores (RH-1). To compare the general means of SPI scores for cyber operators and 
non-cyber operators (RH-2), a one-sample T-Test was used to explore differences among the two 
populations. In order to investigate the relationship between years of experience and SPI scores 
(RH-3), a basic Pearson Correlation table was used to correlate the two variables. A general linear 
model was also used to observe the effects of the interaction between years of experience and 
career on suspicion scores. Finally, to explore the relationship between trust and both suspicion 
and cyber performance (RH-4), multiple linear regression was performed to determine the trust 
questionnaires’ capacity to predict performance scores, along with multiple linear regression to 
determine the combined capacity of trust and SPI scores to predict performance.   
3.6 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the design and methodology used within this 
research. It discussed the distribution of the surveys, the environment in which the surveys were 
taken, the participants who completed the surveys, as well as an overview of the Cyber 200 and 
300 courses in which a portion of the students were enrolled.  
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IV. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the descriptive and statistical analysis conducted on 
the experimental data. It reflects upon the different research questions that encompass the goals 
of this study, along with the results of the research conducted.   
4.2 Performance Measurement 
The performance measurement used in this study, the cyber mission performance 
questionnaire, was scored on a scale of 1-6. To verify the validity of the measure, descriptive 
statistics were applied along with an independent samples T-Test comparing the scores across 
both sample populations. The T-Test displayed in Table 3 reveals that the mean performance 
scores of cyber personnel are significantly different than the performance scores among non-
cyber personnel (p = 0.011) with a mean difference of 2.364. Overall, results across the cyber 
participants (M = 5.33) were higher than results across the non-cyber participants (M = 2.97).  







Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 














 6.691 .011 -15.136 106.776 .000 -2.364 .156 -2.674 -2.054 
          
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics & Correlations 
 For this analysis, all variables were continuous with the exception of “Career,” which 
was coded as a categorical dichotomous variable with 0 representing non-cyber personnel and 1 
representing cyber personnel. Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for the data collected. As 
shown in the table, the mean years of service among the cyber personnel was much higher than 
that of the non-cyber participants. Both populations display a large standard deviation, indicating 
a wide range of years of service among the cyber and non-cyber personnel.   
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Perf Score 122 1 6 4.07 1.478 
SPI Total 122 41 91 64.20 9.432 
Trust Total 122 19 42 28.54 5.415 
Years in Service Cyber 57 10.00 37.00 22.8070 7.25416 
Years in Service Non-Cyber 65 1.00 30.00 8.9308 8.05638 
 
Table 4 displays the correlations among all variables. Among key variable relationships 
are years in service and performance (r = 0.558, p < 0.0001), total SPI scores and Mayer’s trust 
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scores (r = -0.244, p = 0.007), total SPI scores and performance (r = 0.541, p < 0.0001), and 
Mayer’s trust scores and performance (r = -0.313, p < 0.0001). It should also be noted that 
certain individual facets of the total SPI score are strongly correlated with performance. These 
include paranoia (r = 0.435, p = 0.001) and uncertainty/malintent (r = 0.595, p < 0.0001).  
Correlations will be discussed in greater detail throughout the remainder of this chapter.  
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Table 4. Correlations for all variables.  Values for SPI Total and SPI subscale scores are shown, including the paranoia (PAR), 
uncertainty/malintent (UNMI) and cognitive activation (CA) subscale scores. 
 
Career Yrs in Service Perf Score SPI Trust SPI PAR SPI UN/MI SPI CA SPI Total 
Mayer’s 
Trust Total 
Career Pearson Corr 1 .628** .810** -.290** .350** .609** .332** .552** -.432** 
Sig.   .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
Yrs. in 
Service 
Pearson Corr .628** 1 .558** -.322** .301** .618** .304** .543** -.422** 
Sig.  .000  .000 .000 .001 .000 .001 .000 .000 




Pearson Corr .810** .558** 1 -.194* .435** .595** .328** .541** -.313** 
Sig.  .000 .000  .032 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
SPI 
Trust 
Pearson Corr -.290** -.322** -.194* 1 .015 -.144 -.073 -.128 .488** 
Sig.  .001 .000 .032  .870 .113 .424 .160 .000 
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
SPI PAR Pearson Corr .350** .301** .435** .015 1 .678** .388** .625** -.144 
Sig.  .000 .001 .000 .870  .000 .000 .000 .114 
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
SPI 
UN/MI 
Pearson Corr .609** .618** .595** -.144 .678** 1 .508** .887** -.267** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .113 .000  .000 .000 .003 
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
SPI CA Pearson Corr .332** .304** .328** -.073 .388** .508** 1 .848** -.148 
Sig.  .000 .001 .000 .424 .000 .000  .000 .104 
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
SPI 
Total 
Pearson Corr .552** .543** .541** -.128 .625** .887** .848** 1 -.244** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .160 .000 .000 .000  .007 
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
Trust 
Total 
Pearson Corr -.432** -.422** -.313** .488** -.144 -.267** -.148 -.244** 1 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .114 .003 .104 .007  
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




4.4 Suspicion and Performance 
To recall from section 1.5.1, RH-1 claims that an individual’s SPI score will be positively 
correlated to their mission performance score. Figure 6 displays the distributions of performance 
scores among both the cyber and non-cyber populations, indicated by individual scores on the 
cyber mission performance questionnaire.  
 
Figure 6. Distribution of performance scores among cyber and non-cyber personnel. 
As shown in Table 4, mission performance and SPI score have a correlation of 0.541     
(p < 0.0001). To further this analysis, linear regression was performed with SPI score as the 
predictor for the dependent variable of mission performance. As shown in Table 3, there was a 
large amount of variation between the years in service for the different career field categories. 
Further, there was a significant difference in years of service between the career field categories.  
Members of the cyber career field averaged 22.81 years of service (SD = 7.25) while non-cyber 
individuals averaged 8.93 years of service (SD = 8.1). To ensure that this difference between 
populations did not bias the SPI results, the model controlled for years in service prior to 




















The model summary displays the R and R2 goodness of fit measures for the model, 
showing that years of service accounts for 31.2% of the variance in an individual’s performance 
score. R2 increases in the second model, which includes SPI score as well as years in service. As 
shown, the model which includes the SPI scores accounts for 39.2% of the variance in 
performance scores. The change in R2 with the addition of SPI as a predictor amounts to 0.08 (F 
(1,119) = 15.76, p < 0.0001) indicating that the models, with and without the SPI, are statistically 
different. A T-test conducted on each predictor within the regression model indicated that the 
SPI accounted for a statistically significant portion of the variance in the performance score (t 
(1,120) = 3.97, p < 0.0001). The coefficients table displays values of the overall regression 
equation, with Performance Score = -0.15 + 0.054(Years in Service) + 0.053(SPI Score). The 
results displayed in Table 5 indicate that the total SPI score has a significant effect on 
performance score after controlling for years in service (p < 0.0001).  Both the “Years in 
Service” and “SPI Total” variables have a positive influence on the dependent variable 
“Performance Score.”  







4.5 Suspicion among Cyber vs Non-Cyber Personnel 
Section 1.5.2 states that cyber operators will yield higher SPI scores in comparison to 
non-cyber personnel (RH-2). To test this hypothesis, an independent samples T-Test was 
performed on the SPI scores of cyber and non-cyber personnel. The mean SPI score for non-
cyber operators (M = 59.45, SD = 8.06) was lower than the mean SPI score for cyber operators 
(M = 69.61, SD = 7.87). Table 6 displays these results, indicating that the means are significantly 
different (t (1,120) = 7.029, p < 0.0001).   
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Table 6. Cyber and non-cyber SPI scores. 
Group Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
SPI Score Non-Cyber 65 59.45 8.058 1.000 
SPI Score Cyber 57 69.61 7.871 1.043 
 





Variances t-test for Equality of Means 









Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
SPI Total Equal 
variances 
assumed 





-7.040 118.590 .000 -10.168 1.444 -13.028 -7.308 
 
 
Figure 7 displays the separate distributions of SPI scores for the cyber and non-cyber 
populations. As shown in the distributions, the scores of those in cyber are shifted to the right of 




Figure 7. Distribution of SPI scores among cyber and non-cyber personnel. 
4.6 Effects of Years of Experience 
In consideration of section 1.5.3, RH-3 presumes that years of experience will have a 
positive correlation to an individual’s SPI score, and that the correlation will be more prominent 
among cyber operators than among non-cyber operators. As shown in Table 4, the correlation 
between total SPI score and years in service is 0.543, which is significantly greater than zero (p < 
0.0001). A general linear model procedure was used to view the effects of both years in service 
and career on suspicion scores, along with the effect of their interaction. As shown in Table 7, 
the interaction between career and years in service had a significant effect (F (1,118) = 5.92, 
MSE = 56.4, p = 0.016) on the dependent variable of SPI total score. Figure 8 provides a visual 
depiction of the interaction’s effect, displaying the modeled relationship between total SPI scores 
and years in service while moderated by career. Within the interaction plot, non-cyber and cyber 
personnel have similar suspicion levels for less years in service. However, as participants gain 
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experience, suspicion levels show a greater differentiation between the cyber and non-cyber 
sample populations.  






Figure 8. Model results for the two-way interaction between career and years in service on total SPI scores. 
 
4.7 Trust and Performance  
As shown in Table 4, the correlation between Mayer’s trust scale and mission 
performance is -0.313, which is again statistically different from zero (p < 0.0001). Linear 
regression was performed, investigating the predictive capability of the trust measure on cyber 
mission performance. As before, years of service alone accounts for 31.2% of the variance in 
performance scores, while a model including years in service and the trust measurement account 
for 31.9% of the variance. This change is insignificant (t (1,119) = -1.123, p = 0.264) indicating 
that after controlling for years of service, the trust measurement did not have a significant effect 
on performance on the cyber mission questionnaire. Results can be observed in Table 8.  
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Multiple linear regression was also performed to observe the explanatory variables of 
trust and total SPI score, showing their combined effect at predicting the total mission 
performance score after controlling for years of service. Together, trust and suspicion account for 
39.8% of the variance within the cyber mission performance questionnaire. The F-test is 
significant (p < 0.0001), thus it can be assumed that the model explains significant variance in 
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cyber mission performance scores. However, the coefficients table shows that the trust parameter 
does not have statistical significance on the model results (t (1,118) = -1.115, p = 0.267). The 
results can be observed in Table 9.  






This chapter presented the data analysis and results pertaining to relevant research 
questions and hypotheses. It covered the statistical tests performed in order to investigate each 





V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will first summarize the conducted research, along with the interpretation 
and significance of the results. It will then discuss recommendations for action regarding the 
findings, along with addressing the potential for future work in this realm of research.  
5.2 Evaluation of Research Questions 
This section will review the initial research questions and draw conclusions based on the 
data analysis.  
• RQ-1: Is an individual’s level of suspicion correlated to his or her success within the 
cyberspace career field?  
The correlation analysis supported this hypothesis by demonstrating that suspicion and mission 
performance have a significant correlation of 0.541. While accounting for differences in years of 
service among the two sample populations, the SPI scores accounted for 39.2% of variation within 
participants’ mission performance scores. Across both the cyber and non-cyber groups, it can be 
concluded that high levels of suspicion are correlated with one’s ability to perform well on the 
cyber mission performance questionnaire. However, differences in suspicion scores prove to be 
much lower among the two populations for individuals early in their careers and increases 
significantly as time within the cyber career field increases. Overall, performance in the cyberspace 
career field does have a positive relationship with suspicion, and this relationship becomes 
significantly stronger with increased time in the career field. 
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• RQ-2: Do current Air Force cyber operators differ in their levels of suspicion when 
compared to members of other career fields? 
The total SPI is calculated on a scale of 22 to 110. Participants within the cyber operator sample 
population had a mean score of 69.61 versus the non-cyber sample population which had a mean 
score of 59.45. This 10.16 point difference indicates that the sample of cyber personnel were 
generally more suspicious than the sample of non-cyber personnel. It should not go without 
recognition that general increases in suspicion over time prove much more prominent among cyber 
personnel than non-cyber personnel.  In consideration of Bobko’s Three Stage Model, training has 
a large impact on how an individual enters a suspicious state. Within the cyber population alone, 
it is possible that the training and experience that operators gain over their career plays a large role 
in this increase in suspicion compared to members of other career fields. 
• RQ-3: Does an Airman’s years of experience in their field correlate to significant 
differences in levels of suspicion? 
The data presumed that for both sample populations, years of experience and suspicion scores have 
a significant correlation of 0.543. When observing the effects of career, years of service, and the 
interaction of these variables on suspicion, both non-cyber and cyber personnel had similar SPI 
scores among participants with lesser years in service. As years in service increased, there was a 
greater difference in SPI scores between the non-cyber and cyber sample populations. Cyber 
personnel with a large number of years in service were determined to have the highest SPI scores. 
It can be concluded that years of experience is positively correlated with levels of suspicion, 
indicating that more experienced personnel provide higher SPI scores than less experienced 
personnel. Furthermore, while this effect was present for both cyber and non-cyber personnel, the 
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effect was much stronger across the cyber personnel.  Therefore, SPI scores seem to increase in 
conjunction with one’s experience in the cyber career field. 
• RQ-4: Does an Airman’s propensity to trust correlate with both her/his levels of suspicion 
and success within the cyberspace career field? 
The trust measurement used in this study yielded a significant correlation with cyber mission 
performance (r = -0.313, p < 0.0001). Trust also contributed to 31.9% of the variance within 
performance scores after controlling for years in service; however, these results do not prove to be 
a significant change from the explained variance by years of service alone. These results indicate 
that although there is a correlation between an individual’s level of trust and cyber performance, 
this relationship is largely due to years in service as opposed to trust as an independent parameter. 
Further investigation shows that the trust measurement in conjunction with SPI scores account for 
39.8% of variance in performance scores. This is a slight increase from the 39.2% of variance that 
is explained by suspicion alone while also controlling for years in service; however, the 
contribution made by the trust parameter to this model does not prove to be significant (p = 0.267).  
5.3 Significance of Research 
The findings within this research have the potential to contribute a noticeable impact on 
the cyber career field within the entirety of the Department of Defense. This research is the first 
of its kind to consider suspicion as an influencing factor on cyber performance; and opens the 
door for additional exploration on the subject matter. Successful members of the cyber career 
field demonstrated higher levels of suspicion than their non-cyber counterparts, especially with 
increased experience. While the findings on suspicion within this research do not provide the 
necessary data to formulate a screening tool into the cyber career field, the results present 
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important findings for the career field at large. This increase over time indicates that suspicion 
may be a learned attribute and can thus be utilized to train cyber personnel to be more successful 
within their career field. If early cyber training focuses on enhancing the suspicion of operators, 
these training modifications could accelerate the trend of increasing suspicion, thus improving 
the quality of the cyber force.  
In addition to contributions in the cyber career field, the findings of this research provide 
insights into other academic fields that display a general lack of literature in regard to suspicion 
and trust. While it is accepted that both trust and suspicion play a role in the tendencies of groups 
and individuals, there have been few findings to prove exactly what these effects may entail or 
that discuss the relationship between trust and suspicion. This study investigated the theorized 
relationship between trust and suspicion propensity, ultimately showing that the two attributes 
display a moderate, yet significant, negative correlation. The significance of this correlation 
provides some credibility to the argument that both trust and suspicion are predicting a similar 
underlying phenomenon. Furthermore, this thesis showed that suspicion (as measured through 
the SPI) is an indicator of performance while trust (as measured with Mayer’s trust measure) 
does not provide similar predictability. These findings can provide insight to a field that 
currently holds very little research, while also indicating to cyber personnel that suspicion should 
be a prioritized aspect of training as opposed to trust. The findings also present an opportunity 
for further exploration into the relationship between the attributes of trust and suspicion, along 
with their effect on one another, on one’s personality, and performance in different career fields.  
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
The indications in this research suggest that while variability in cyber performance is 
partially explained by operator suspicion, there are still other attributes that contribute to success 
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within the career field. These results pose an opportunity for further research into additional 
attributes that may affect one’s ability to perform well at various cyber operations. As the 
findings presented in this study indicated that suspicion tends to increase cyber performance as 
an individual acquires years of experience, a focal point of future research should lie in gaining 
an understanding of how suspicion changes over time. The little research on suspicion that has 
been conducted in the past indicates that individuals hold a propensity to become suspicious. 
However, this study indicates that it is a learned attribute. These conflicting findings present an 
opportunity for further investigation among various career fields in order to validate suspicion as 
a characteristic that can be learned or that individuals are predisposed to act upon.   
A key revelation from these findings includes the potential for suspicion to contribute to 
training modifications within the cyber career field. If future research is conducted, it has the 
potential to identify how and why operators act upon their suspicions and how these suspicions 
become present in certain individuals. If these questions can be answered, they pose a potential 
for accelerating the development of suspicion in cyber operators and, in turn, accelerating greater 
levels of success within the career field. There is also still room for investigation into the specific 
attributes that contribute to initial success in the career field. In regard to the development of a 
screening tool for cyber within the Air Force, additional research can be conducted to explore 
which characteristics allow airmen to be successful at cyber operations. Potential factors for 
investigation include creativity, persistence, general curiosity, detail orientation, and analytical 
thinking.  
In order to conduct further validation of the recently developed Suspicion Propensity 
Index and to answer questions regarding suspicion as an attribute, the SPI can be used to 
evaluate individuals undergoing initial cyber training at Keesler Air Force Base in which trainees 
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undergo a six-month course to successfully become operators in the cyber field. A great 
assessment of the SPI’s predictive ability could include an initial administration of the index 
upon the start of cyber training. Following the course’s conclusion, SPI scores could be 
compared to individuals’ pass/fail rates, along with instructor ratings of performance. These 
results would further indicate suspicion’s relationship with performance in the cyber field, 
looking at a new population of individuals just beginning their career.  
Outside of the cyber realm, additional research can be conducted exploring the impact of 
both trust and suspicion on individuals’ daily lives. While within this study the two attributes 
proved to have an inverse relationship, further investigation into the effect of this relationship 
would benefit other areas of academia. For example, one could look at suspicion and trust 
propensity in terms of their effects on correspondence bias, the formation and maintenance of 
personal relationships, workplace interactions, and attributional thinking.  
5.5 Summary 
In summary, this research is applicable to the large-scale DoD challenge of training 
individuals to be successful within the cyber career field. Through the novel investigation of 
suspicion as a predictor for improving cyber capabilities, this research provides an initial step to 
modifying the training tools utilized by cyber personnel in the Air Force and other branches of 
the United States military. While there is still a vast amount of research that should be conducted 
to bolster the findings of this thesis, the results have the capacity for a long-term influence on the 





Appendix A: Demographics Questionnaire 
1. Please indicate your age: ______ 
2. Please indicate your gender: Male ______    Female ______ 
3. Please answer the following statements regarding your previous education: 
a. Highest level of education previously achieved: 
High School____ Some College____ Bachelors ____ Master’s ____ Ph.D. ___ 
b. Previous education major: _________________________________ 
c. Indicate your GPA for the highest level of education achieved: ______ 
d. Indicate how many cyber courses have you completed over your academic career 
(programming, security, engineering, etc.): ______ 
4. If currently attending school, please answer the following statements: 
a. Indicate the level of education you are currently pursuing: 
Certificate____ Masters _____ Ph.D._____ Other (specify): ________________ 
b. Indicate your current major: _______________________________ 
c. Indicate your current GPA: ________ 
d. GRE Score (if applicable): _________ 
5. Please answer the following statements regarding your work experiences: 
a. Indicate your primary career field occupation: _________________________ 
b. Indicate number of years’ experience in primary career field: __________ 
6. Please indicate your employment category: Military ______ Civilian ______ 
a. If military, 
i. Indicate your current rank: ________ 
ii. Indicate total years in service: _______ 
b. If civilian, 
i. Indicate employment sub-category:  
Government _____ Contractor ______ Other______ 
ii. Indicate total years in sub-category: ______ 
iii. If prior military, indicate number of years in military service: _____ 
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Appendix B: Suspicion Propensity Index 
Purpose: The purpose of this questionnaire is to gain insights into your general inclination 
towards the others and/or the actions of others.   
Instructions: For the following scenarios, please read the description and indicate how accurately 
each of the response statements describes you.  
Scenario 1.  
Imagine you have applied for a job, for which you are 
qualified, and have gone through the interview process.  
Shortly after the interview, you receive notification that the 

















































a. I would decide to move on and continue searching for a 
job.  
     
b. I would follow up with someone at the company and 
request more information about why I wasn’t chosen.  
     
c. I would be certain that someone I was in contact with 
during the process must not like me, and I would do 
something like telling others to avoid this company. 
     
d. I would wonder if there was someone at the company who 
I had contact with who purposely wanted to keep me from 
getting the job. 
     
 
Scenario 2. 
Imagine that you see a discussion on a social networking 
website indicating that several of your friends got together this 

















































a. I would be certain that my friends purposefully excluded 
me, and I would do something such as refuse to continue 
socially interacting with them.  
     
b. I would not dwell on it, and instead focus my thoughts on 
something else.  
     
c. I would search for more information and reasons as to 
why they might have gotten together and not contact me 
(such as an invitation by someone I’m not friends with). 
     





Imagine you are interested in buying a new car and are in a car 
showroom. After telling a salesperson you are interested in a 
mid-level model, he says, “In the long run, a high-end model 

















































a. I would look around and listen to see if other customers 
were receiving the same advice from the salespeople.  
     
b. I would wonder if the salesperson was only interested in 
the potential increase in the commission from the sale.   
     
c. I would be certain that the salesperson is not truly trying 
to help me, and I would do something such as leave and 
never return to that dealership.  
     
d. I would accept the help – it’s always nice to have an 
expert opinion.  




Imagine you enter a contest for a local school’s fundraiser to 
guess the number of marbles in a large jar.  The prize is a 
$100 gift card to a popular online store.  After making your 
best guess, you find out the following week that you did not 
















































a. I would wonder if the teacher who won had cheated 
and/or had gotten inside information on this activity.  
     
b. I would accept another person winning – better luck next 
time.  
     
c. I would think about flaws in my own thinking (e.g., flaws 
in how I came up with my estimate) that might explain 
why I didn’t win.) 
     
d. I would be certain that the contest was rigged, and I would 
do something such as never participate in that school’s 
fundraisers again.  









Imagine that you have a teenage son.  He comes home a half 
hour before curfew and heads straight to his room without 
stopping to talk to you.   In the past he always has checked in 
with you when arriving home, and he has never returned home 
















































a. I would assume he is tired and probably just didn’t feel 
like stopping to talk to me.  
     
b. I would wonder what he might be hiding from me.  (high 
agreement indicates uncertainty and perceived 
malintent) 
     
c. I would be certain that he is hiding something from me, 
and I would do something such as taking away his driving 
privileges without discussing it further with him. 
     
d. I would go to his room and attempt to find out what might 
be wrong.  
     
 
Scenario 6. 
Imagine you have just visited an online store to shop for a book 
you want to purchase.  After finding the book you want on a 
discount website that you haven’t heard of before, you decide to 
go ahead and purchase the book.  After entering your credit card 
information and clicking the “confirm purchase” button, you wait 
for an email confirmation of your purchase.  However, the email 















































a. I would be certain that the lack of email confirmation meant 
that I had lost the money, and I would do something such as 
immediately cancel my credit card or not shop online in the 
future.  
     
b. I would try to email the company to determine if the purchase 
was confirmed, and I would attempt to find out more 
information about the company.  
     
c. I would wonder if there was any danger in providing my credit 
card information. 
     
d. I would wait a few days to see if the confirmation is delivered 
as the website promised.  





Scenario 7.  
Imagine you start working for a new company and are told by 
your supervisor that you will receive a raise within the first 3 
months. After 5 months, you haven’t received a raise.  When 

















































a. I would try to get more information (e.g., Did coworkers 
get their raises on time? Is the company doing okay 
financially?)  
     
b. I would be certain that my supervisor is trying to avoid 
paying me the raise I deserve, and I would do something 
such as consider quitting.  
     
c. I would not worry.  I was told I would get a raise so one 
will happen soon.  
     
d. I would wonder if my supervisor was trying to take 
advantage of me.  
     
 
 
Scenario 8.  
Imagine one afternoon you are home and your doorbell rings.   
You aren’t expecting anyone, and you look through the 
peephole in your door. The person, who you don’t recognize, 

















































a. I would wonder if the person is there to take advantage of 
me in some way.  
     
b. I would be certain that this is a solicitation that I did not 
want, and I would do something such as keep quiet and 
not even answer the door.  
     
c. I would open the door and invite the person inside my 
home.   
     
d. I would answer the door and ask questions to determine 
why the person is there. 








Scenario 9.   
Imagine you have pulled off an interstate to stop for gas at a 
gas station. You are approached by a male asking for money.  
He tells you his car broke down, and he and his spouse are on 

















































a. I would look to see if I have any money I could spare.       
b. I would be certain that this person is conning me, and I 
would do something such as call the police or quickly 
walk away from him.  
     
c. I would wonder if the person is lying to take advantage of 
me.  
     
d. I would ask him questions to try to determine if his story 
was accurate or what it might really be.  
     
 
Scenario 10.   
Imagine you are using your computer for a search on a topic 
of interest.  You soon notice that your computer is running 













































a. I would be certain that there is something very wrong, and 
I would do something such as immediately shut the 
computer down without completing my search.  
     
b. I would worry that someone is trying to hack into my 
computer to cause me harm.   
     
c. I would keep working on the search – it’s likely nothing to 
be concerned about.  
     
d. I would try to think of reasons the computer could be 
running slow. 












Imagine you are at a convenience store and you need to pay 
your bill.  The charge for your items is $20.57, and you give 
$30 in cash to the attendant. He gives you 43 cents, a $5 bill, 

















































a. After counting my change, I would wonder if the error 
was made on purpose 
     
b. I would not count my change, and I would put it away 
without a second thought.  
     
c. After counting my change, I would think about 
possible reasons that I did not get what I expected to 
get.  
     
d. Before even looking at my change, I would be certain 
that it was wrong and that the attendant is like all 
cashiers – who always try to short-change customers – 
and I would immediately count my change in front of 
him.  


















Appendix C: Personality Questionnaire 
Purpose: The purpose of this questionnaire is to gain insights into your general inclination 
towards the others and/or the actions of others.   
Instructions: Read each of the following statements carefully and circle the number that best 
describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement using the 7-point scale provided 
below.  









       
 
1. Most experts tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Most adults are competent at their jobs.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. Most salespeople are honest in describing their products.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. These days, you must be alert, or someone is likely to take advantage of you.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. One should be very cautious with strangers.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. Most repair people will not overcharge people who are ignorant of their specialty 





Appendix D: Mission Scenario Questionnaire 
Purpose: The purpose of this questionnaire is to gain insights into your perception of the 
described mission scenarios.  
Instructions: For the following scenarios, please read the description and select the response 
which most closely aligns with the action(s) you would take.  
1. Scenario: After signing into your work computer one morning, you observe an unexpected 
software installation. Not thinking much of the software, you begin to read your work emails 
when you notice that the software is attempting to access your computer’s microphone and 
webcam.  
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below: 
A. Continue working on your computer, paying extra attention to any irregular activity that 
may further indicate the presence of a hacker.  
B. Immediately power down your computer, the hacker cannot persist if the processor is not 
turned on.   
C. Leave your computer running and immediately report the incident to your office’s security 
manager.   
2. Scenario: You are an RPA pilot conducting a mission that has been extended due to 
unforeseen circumstances. With extremely low fuel levels, you now have to stop at a nearby base 
to refuel in order to conduct the extended mission. However, the shortest route to the base is 
programmed to fly through Iranian airspace.  
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below: 
A. Divert the drone to land in an unsecure airfield in Afghanistan where US forces are 
present, but there may be unknown threats  
B. Fly the drone on the shortest route possible, which happens to be contested airspace which 
Iran has recently claimed as their own.  
C. Crash land the drone in the Arabian gulf and send US Naval troops to recover the aircraft 
(ensure destruction). This will result in a loss of the US asset would prevent it from falling 
into the hands of the enemy.  
3. Scenario: Imagine you are a cyber operator monitoring the communications and weapons 
systems on an F-22 mission. Shortly after refueling at a friendly base, you observe traffic on the 
aircraft’s mission systems that deviate substantially from its known baseline. This indicates the 
potential for onboard systems being compromised.   
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below: 
A. Shut down communication with the aircraft. This will ensure that adversary forces can no 
longer listen to information regarding the mission, however, it will also cut coordination 
with the F-22. 
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B. Continue to monitor the network traffic and instruct the F-22 to continue its mission as 
planned.  
C. Abort the mission and instruct the F-22 to land at the nearest base.     
4. Scenario: You are the ranking officer on a logistics convoy in a combat zone. You have 
received intelligence from one of the locals working on the base that ISIS has intercepted 
communications (mission details) regarding the convoy from one of the troops’ cell phones.  
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below: 
A. Continue on predetermined patrol (mission as planned) with increased security along 
route. 
B. Ensure all airmen turn off their cellphones. Reschedule the mission for a different time 
along a different route, which will allow for 80% completion of the original mission  
C. Cancel the mission altogether.   
5. Scenario: You are an offensive Cyber Operator and are aiming to investigate the Chinese 
militarization of the South China Sea. You successfully infiltrate a Chinese Surface-to-Air 
Missile (SAM) System and realize they are currently targeting an allied vessel in the region.  
 Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below: 
A. You continue to monitor the Chinese activity, collecting intelligence while remaining 
undercover in the system. 
B. You attempt to disable the system. This will protect the allied vessel from a potential 
attack but will also reveal your presence to the Chinese in the intelligence system.  
C. You stop monitoring the intelligence systems and inform the allied vessel of the potential 
threat.  
6. Scenario: You are a Cyber Operations Officer supporting an intelligence gathering mission 
targeting a Chinese Nuclear Enrichment Facility. While attempting to infiltrate potentially useful 
intelligence, you realize that your network traffic has been identified by Chinese cyber security 
protocols.  
Based on your initial assessment, select the best response from the list below: 
A. Do your best to infiltrate as much information as possible before enemy forces eliminate 
you from the network. 
B. Immediately stop transmitting. Passively monitor the network traffic until you believe it 
is safe to transmit the remaining intelligence. 
C. Stop transmitting and remove any attributable data so that your exploitation methods 
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